Citation: Tell, Håkan. 2011. Plato's Counterfeit Sophists. Hellenic Studies Series 44. Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:hul.ebook:CHS_Tell.Platos_Counterfeit_Sophists.2011.
Get the latest updates from the CHS regarding programs, fellowships, and more!
There is compelling evidence that the term σοφιστής was contested in antiquity, especially in the works of Plato and Isocrates. It is thus problematic for moderns to treat this term as if it were a neutral classification—thereby removing it from its original, contentious context. The use of σοφιστής is intertwined with the development of increasingly specialized practices within the field of sophia and the corollary struggles over the appropriation of the terms philosophia and philosophos. [4] If the term sophist occurred in a struggle over cultural and intellectual authority—where it was employed (mainly by Plato) to denigrate certain sophoi as less legitimate—then the uncritical adoption of Platonic terminology effectively runs the risk of taking sides in an ideologically driven battle over legitimacy. [5]
Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle ultimately won the struggle over definition, and the pejorative designation of certain sophoi as sophists has become the “historical” truth. But this truth still does not support our embrace of the term as inevitable. Instead, we must seek to recreate the range of possible intellectual positions available at the time as well as the various points of contention among them; that is, our job is not to perpetuate the Platonic victory of classification, but rather to examine the conditions under which the term “sophist” came to be attached to certain individuals with derogatory connotations. [6]
Others have turned to the history of the word σοφιστής to find more specific predecessors to the sophists. Werner Jaeger, Wilhelm Nestle, and John Morrison, for example, conclude that the sophists were the inheritors of the early Greek poetic legacy, since Homer, Hesiod, Solon, and Simonides were all referred to by that name, and since the sophists all seemed to continue the educational vocation of the poets. [16] The reason for the shift of the word σοφιστής from the poets to the sophists—from poetry to prose—was that “the didactic function came to be more and more fulfilled through this medium.” [17]
But all these conclusions rest on the assumption that there is a clear break in the use of the term σοφιστής in the second half of the fifth century BCE, when the sophists established themselves as a new kind of practitioner of wisdom, and that only the pre-sophistic uses are illustrative of its wider range of connotations. It is my contention that this is an artificial demarcation, and that the time limit imposed on the examples considered is problematic. Instead, I would like to reconsider the use of σοφιστής well into the second half of the fifth century and beyond, without making any a priori assumptions about its application. We must thus be open to the possibility that the sophists did not constitute the end stage of the semantic development of the word σοφιστής, but that it could continue to be used—even after the emergence of the “sophistic movement”—to refer to a broad group of people. More specifically, we shall focus on its continued use in respect to “philosophers,” that is, to those practitioners of wisdom we traditionally refer to as Presocratics, Socratics, Aristotelians, etc.
It is against these consistent accounts that Plato asserts that Thales, Pittacus, and Bias avoided politics. Indeed, Alcaeus, Demodocus, Hipponax, and Herodotus are all earlier than Plato, and their picture is repeatedly mirrored in later authors. It is especially relevant that Aristotle deviates from Plato’s revisionist portrayal of the apolitical sage. For examples, he refers to Pittacus as a ruler, lawgiver, and aisymnetes, [45] and in the Nicomachean Ethics he quotes Bias in the context of the importance of justice for a ruler. [46] In Aristotle’s mind, then, both Pittacus and Bias could be invoked as examples of politically significant historical figures. [47]
Given this alternative historical appropriation of the term “sophist” by Isocrates, it might be worthwhile to look closer at what role he assigns the sophists in his intellectual system. Such an investigation might help illuminate the competing—and often clashing—attempts at jockeying for position in the emerging field of intellectual production. Many scholars have focused on the wide discrepancies between Plato’s and Isocrates’ understanding of φιλοσοφία, [51] but few have extended their analyses to include the equally contradictory roles ascribed to the sophists. Some even quote Isocrates when discussing the “Platonic sophists” without pausing to question whether the label refers to the same persons. [52] Both Isocrates and Plato describe philosophy as much in terms of what it is not, as in terms of what it is. In this respect the sophists are of particular significance in both of their intellectual systems.
In addition to the specific individuals that Isocrates classifies as sophists, he often uses the term in contrast to the poets, as a shorthand for practitioners of wisdom in general. This is how he employs σοφιστής in To Demonicus (51), where he admonishes his addressee to learn both what is best in the poets (τῶν ποιητῶν τὰ βέλτιστα) and the useful utterances of the other sophists (τῶν ἄλλων σοφιστῶν, εἴ τι χρήσιμον εἰρήκασιν); and he makes a similar bipartite division of the sources of wisdom between the poets (ποιηταί) and the sophists (σοφισταί) in the Panegyricus (82) and in To Nicocles (13). [69] In these examples, then, far from limiting its application to a defined and recognizable subgroup of practitioners of wisdom, Isocrates seems to use σοφιστής as an unmarked and inclusive term to refer to the wisdom tradition in a broad sense, presumably entailing everyone from the Seven Sages onward. [70]
In the Antidosis (168–170), Isocrates further clarifies his understanding of the relationship among rhetoric, sophistry, and philosophy. When elaborating on the reasons he is viewed with suspicion by his fellow Athenians, he notices that there is a general intolerance against rhetorical instruction (τὴν τῶν λόγων παιδείαν) in Athens, and that he thus runs the danger of suffering harm due to the common prejudice against the sophists (τῆς δὲ κοινῆς τῆς περὶ τοὺς σοφιστὰς διαβολῆς). But, he continues, he will give many reasons to prove that the prejudice against philosophy is unjust (φιλοσοφίαν … ἀδίκως διαβεβλημένην) and that it should rather be embraced than hated. [71]
But it is precisely here that Isocrates deviates from the Platonic typology. Instead of maintaining the distinction between philosophy and sophistry, he seems to conflate the two by saying 1) that there is a common prejudice against the sophists, and 2) that the prejudice addressed against philosophy is unjustified. He uses a participial form of διαβάλλομαι twice within one paragraph to link semantically the prejudice directed at the sophists and philosophy, and so signifies that the same group of people is meant, only from two different perspectives: in the first instance they are labeled by the derogatory tag of their detractors (σοφιστής), while in the second instance they are given the privileged treatment by Isocrates as fellow sophoi, and their practices are thus referred to as belonging to the field of philosophy (φιλοσοφία). [74] Isocrates seems to suggest that the word sophist is used as a term of abuse against all those involved in philosophy, not exclusively with reference to a special subgroup of second-rate intellectuals, as is the practice in Plato. [75] When representing voices sympathetic to practitioners of wisdom, however, Isocrates uses the word φιλοσοφία to characterize their practices.
When two antagonists, with vocations so sharply contrasted as those of Plato and Isocrates were, both claim for themselves the name of Philosopher and endeavour each to fix on the other the odious appellation of Sophist, we may surely conclude that either term is in popular usage so vague as easily to comprehend both, and that the two are varyingly contrasted according to the temper of the speaker. [78]
We should thus be sufficiently warned neither to reify the term σοφιστής nor even to assume that it applies to specific individuals. It is true that Plato and Isocrates are in agreement that both Protagoras and Gorgias should be counted among the sophists, but the disagreement—particularly with regard to Solon, Empedocles, and Parmenides—is significant enough to underscore their widely different positions on sophistry and philosophy. I have focused on the difference between Plato and Isocrates in their understanding and application of “sophist” and “philosopher.” One could of course argue that an exploration of how Xenophon and Aristotle use these terms might give more weight to the Platonic evidence in favor of Isocrates. But both Xenophon and Aristotle are heavily indebted to the Platonic position and add surprisingly little by way of new or dissenting material on the sophists. One might equally complain over the lack of consideration of later evidence from, say, Philostratus and the rest, but here the difficulty is both the strong echoes of Plato, on the one hand, and the distance in time, on the other. What makes Isocrates so relevant is precisely his position as a contemporary of Plato—and one with a dissenting view on philosophy and sophistry.
In conjunction with his elaborate double attempt at disassociating the sophists from the tradition of the Seven Sages and the “legitimate” philosophical tradition, Plato remarks that the sophists were the first to charge money (Hippias Major 282c6). Given the contentious nature of Plato’s history of philosophy just outlined, we need to reevaluate his statement of the sophists’ habit of teaching for pay with this context in mind. To this we turn next.
[ back ] 1. See, for example, Guthrie 1971:3–26 and Romilly 1992:vii–xv. This balkanization of the sophists has been challenged, mainly through Lloyd’s influential contributions to Greek philosophy (e. g. Lloyd 1979:81, esp. n112; 1987:92–93). See also Ford 1993; Wallace 1998 and 2007; Nightingale 2000; Thomas 2000:10 and 21. For the most part, however, this challenge to the validity of “sophist” as a useful category has been voiced without reexamination of its use in antiquity. Ultimately, the decision to abandon “sophist” as an intellectual and historical category has to rest upon such an investigation. See introduction, esp. 9–10.
[ back ] 2. E.g. Guthrie 1971:27–34. But see Edmunds 2006, who argues that no such narrowing of the use of σοφιστής had taken place in the fifth century, but only later, mainly through Plato’s establishment of philosophy as a distinct and specialized activity.
[ back ] 3. “Presocratic” is a modern coinage, notably adopted by Diels in his Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Surprisingly, this neologism has become almost universally adopted and is frequently used alongside the term sophist, which, in contrast, was in general circulation in antiquity. The modern adoption of clear and consistent taxonomies can sometimes make us oblivious to a term’s original polyvalence and contested status. For a more complete discussion of “Presocratic” as a historical category, see Laks 2006.
[ back ] 4. For a discussion of early contestations over philosophia and philosophos, see Ford 1993:41; Nightingale 1995, esp. chapter 1. See also Lloyd 2005, who points out that some of the earliest attested uses of philosophia and philosophos appear to carry derogatory connotations (12).
[ back ] 5. Cf. Nehamas (1990:5), who, in respect to the contrasting views of Plato and Isocrates on philosophy, writes: “It is not my purpose here to argue that either Plato or Isocrates was correct in his conception of the nature of philosophy, especially since I believe, on independent grounds, that this is not a question that can ever be answered. Indeed, I might say that this is precisely the point I am trying to make in historical terms in this essay.”
[ back ] 6. My theoretical orientation owes much to the cultural sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. For the implications of his method to my analysis, see introduction, 19–21.
[ back ] 7. There are good reasons to focus on the many areas of intellectual overlap and continuity among the various groups of sophoi rather than exclusively seeking to separate and compartmentalize them. This is the ambition with the discussion in chapters three to six.
[ back ] 8. Cf. Photius Lexicon 528 Naber: τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν σοφιστὴς ὁ σοφὸς ἐκαλεῖτο.[ back ] 9. For this view, see Nestle 1942:249. Kerferd 1950:8, on the other hand, following Grote 1872, distinguishes between an originally more general use of σοφός and σοφία and the restricted application of σοφιστής.
[ back ] 10. The terms “limited” and “indeterminate” are Grant’s, 1885, 1:110. On page 113 he writes: “We see, then, that the word ‘Sophist,’ having first had a merely general signification, denoting ‘philosopher,’ ‘man of letters,’ ‘artist,’ &c., acquired a special meaning after the middle of the fifth century, as the designation of a particular class of teachers. And then men began to talk of ‘the Sophists,’—referring to this class.”